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For a century or so much Greek mathematics has been interpreted as algebra in geometric
and arithmetical disguise. But especially over the last 25 years some historians of mathematics
have raised objections to this interpretation, finding it to be misleading and anachronistic,
and even wrong. Accepting these criticisms, I consider Euclid’s Elements in this context: if it
cannot be read in this algebraic manner, how did he conceive and handle his various types
of quantity? The question is not merely of historical interest, for it raises issues about basic
relationships between algebra, arithmetic, and geometry.  1996 Academic Press, Inc.
In de afgelopen eeuwen is de Griekse wiskunde vooral gezien als algebra in een meetkundige
of rekenkundige gedaante. Maar vooral in de laatste 25 jaar hebben enkele historici van de
wiskunde betoogd dat deze interpretatie misleidend, anachronistisch of zelfs onjuist is. Op
basis van deze kritiek beschouw ik de Elementen van Euclides met de volgende vraag: als
dit werk niet op deze algebraische manier gelezen kan worden, hoe vatte Euclides dan de
diverse soorten ‘grootheid’ op en hoe ging hij ermee om? Deze vraag is niet alleen van
historisch belang, maar heeft ook te maken met de fundamentele relaties tussen algebra,
rekenkunde en meetkunde.  1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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1. INTRODUCTION: EUCLID AS AN ALGEBRAIST
Although Euclid’s Elements was not the first work of its kind when it was written
around 300 B.C., it seems to have soon become a focal point for later writers, with
innumerable commentaries, editions, and translations over the centuries. For a long
time it was an active source for new results; then it became a classic, upheld by
some as a fine tool for mathematical education.
In the course of this change of status, a change in interpretation gradually
emerged. The Elements was usually taken at face value to be an account of geometry
and arithmetic; but when algebra began to develop among some Arabic mathemati-
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cians from the 8th century and in Europe from the late Middle Ages, parts of the
work were held to be algebraic in character and were even rewritten in algebraic
terms and notations. An interesting example from the early 19th century is provided
by Franc¸ois Peyrard, librarian of the E´cole Polytechnique, who produced editions
and translations of various Greek mathematicians. Those of Euclid (partial in 1804,
full in 1814–1818) did not contain much commentary;1 but in the notes added to
his translation [26] of Archimedes in 1807 he rewrote several results as algebra,
and was widely praised for so doing by various contemporaries, especially J. L.
Lagrange, who advocated the conversion of mathematical theories into algebraic
forms as a general principle.
Such praise, and the status of France as by far the leading mathematical country
of that time, must have given the algebraic reading of Greek mathematics much
greater status. In any event, from the mid 19th century a line of thought evolved
in which much Greek mathematics was seen as algebraic in disguise, as it were.
Expounded by Georg Nesselmann in a volume of 1847 on ‘‘the algebra of the
Greeks’’ [24], this thesis took a still more specific form in the 1880s, especially from
Paul Tannery in 1882 [34] and Hieronymus Zeuthen four years later [43]. They
interpreted much of the Elements and some other Greek mathematics as ‘‘geometri-
c(al) algebra’’ (their phrase), that is, common algebra with variables, roughly after
the manner of Descartes though without necessarily anticipating his exact concerns,
and limited to three geometrical dimensions. The earlier Books of the Elements
were held to deal with simple algebraic identities and forms, while many of the
later constructions correspond to the extraction of roots from equations, normally
quadratic but sometimes quartic. For some commentators the pertaining operations
constituted a ‘‘geometric arithmetic’’; for convenience I shall subsume this aspect
under the term ‘‘geometric algebra.’’
This interpretation of much Greek mathematics, especially the Elements, soon
became popular. An important example is the commentaries given by Sir Thomas
Heath in his English translation of 1908, based upon a text established by J. L.
Heiberg in the 1880s. I shall use it here, in the second edition [13] of 1926, citing
an item by its Book and proposition (or definition or postulate) number; thus,
‘‘(2.prop.1)’’ is Book 2, proposition 1, while ‘‘(*2.prop.1)’’ refers to that proposition
as an example of a point also evident elsewhere in the work.
Around 1930 the interpretation was adopted by figures such as Otto Neugebauer,
who then sought the algebraic origins in Babylonian mathematics. It was picked
up by his follower Bartel L. van der Waerden, whose articles, and especially the
book Science Awakening [40] of 1954, first published in Dutch in 1950, have been
influential sources. Heath’s follower, Ivor Thomas, was a similar influence, especially
with his edition [36] (1939–1941) of Greek texts. It came to be normal historiography
1 Peyrard’s full edition (3 vols., 1814–1818, including Books 14 and 15 and the Data) was based upon
a Vatican manuscript; a quotation from his introduction appears in Section 11. Only one of the Data
problems was algebraicized in his commentary. A distinguished French example just before Peyrard is
J. E. Montucla in 1799 [20, 278]; he multiplied magnitudes, unfortunately, but at least he used ‘‘::’’ in
proportions (see Section 8).
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FIGURE 1
of mathematics during this century and remains influential; for example, most
general histories of mathematics adopt some form of it in their account of the
Elements, usually without much discussion.
A typical simple example of the interpretation is (2.prop.4; see Fig. 1): ‘‘If a
straight line be cut at random, the square on the whole is equal to the squares on
the segments and twice the rectangle contained by the segments.’’ This is held to
be, at base,
(a 1 b)2 5 a2 1 2ab 1 b2, (1.1)
when the sides are the lines a and b as shown. A more sophisticated example is
(6.prop.28), which uses an important construction called ‘‘application of areas,’’
where the task is to set a parallelogram P of given size, and similar to but smaller
than another given parallelogram, upon a given line as base. In geometric algebra,
this comes down to solving a quadratic equation in x, a length important in the
construction of P. We return to this example in Section 11.
In this article, I examine the credentials and verisimilitude of geometric algebra
as an interpretation of the Elements. Especially during the last quarter century,
critical voices against geometric algebra have been heard, answered by defenders.
Here, I find in favor of the critics. First, I shall summarize the main objections, and
also introduce three categories of algebraicization which refine considerably the
clarity of the positions on each side of the dispute. Then I state three features of
the Elements which seem to deserve a central place in the discussion.
The main purpose of this article is to present, in a manner convenient for fellow
nonspecialists in Greek mathematics, a general answer to the questions posed by
my title: the quantities and propositions with which Euclid works, and the manner
in which he handles them. I develop my interpretation in Sections 4–9, where
drawing especially on the three features just mentioned, I shall suggest why, and
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not just that, the Elements cannot be read as geometric algebra. Finally, the general
methodological questions are reviewed, using, in Section 11, four examples from
the disputed literature. Throughout I use quotation marks not only for quoted texts
and names but also to indicate the mention rather than the use of words or symbols.
Some limitations of the paper need explanation. First, I am not a Greek scholar,
but I have checked various technical terms with experts. Heath’s reputation for
producing a (welcomely) literal translation from the Greek appears to be quite
justified; indeed, if points of my interpretation falter because of his translation, then
we are all in trouble! Similarly, I shall not discuss any philological or etymological
questions, or scribal practices in manuscript editions.
Second, while there have been editions of Euclid based on sources other than
that established by Heiberg and translated by Heath, my examination of some others
suggests that the differences between them are not significant for my interpretation,
although, of course, differences of detail arise. Hubertus Busard and Menso Folkerts
have recently published an important comparative edition [3] of an influential
medieval Latin version where such minor variants are evident, but no more.
Third, I take the Elements as it stands (in its 13 Books, the two numbered 14
and 15 being later interpolations). I am not concerned with the pre- or post-history
of the work, the consequences of its interpretation to other figures, or possible
sources in Babylonian mathematics. David Fowler has recently questioned most
standard wisdom on these issues [7]. Further, I shall mention only one other of
Euclid’s own works.
Fourth, there are well known epistemological difficulties in the Elements: defini-
tions which are not really definitions, constructions and theorems muddled together
((6.prop.28) above is an example), and so on. I shall pass over these matters as
much as possible.
Fifth, being only concerned with the general principles of Euclid’s handling of
his quantities, I shall ignore most of the theories developed from them: perfect
numbers, the ‘‘binomial’’ and ‘‘apotome’’ magnitudes of Book 10 (surd expressions
to the algebraists), and so on. I shall also not discuss his various methods of proof.
Finally, while I use some algebraic letters to represent Euclid’s procedures and
results, I try to minimize the differences from his arithmetic and geometric concerns.
These limitations do not reflect any dismissal on my part of the merit of the
issues raised; they require the skills of specialists. Several of them are addressed
or noted in the literature cited below.
2. THE CASE AGAINST GEOMETRIC ALGEBRA
Heath himself saw limitations to reading parts of Euclid as geometric algebra:
‘‘The algebraical method has been preferred to Euclid’s by some English editors;
but it should not find favour with those who wish to preserve the essential features
of Greek geometry as presented by its greatest exponents, or to appreciate their
point of view’’ [13, 1:373–374]. At the time of his comments in the mid 1920s, some
nonadherents to geometric algebra began to express themselves. For example,
E. J. Dijksterhuis avoided it in his presentation of the Elements in Dutch in 1929–
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1930 [4]. During the mid 1930s, in an important article on ‘‘Greek Logistic and the
Origins of Algebra,’’ Jacob Klein was guarded in its use, precisely because he
compared and contrasted Greek mathematics with the genuine symbolic algebra
of the European Renaissance [15]. His essay was Englished in 1968, appearing at
a time when more modern critics began to appear. A´rpa´d Szabo´ attacked geometric
algebra in 1969 in an appendix to a largely philological examination of the origins
of Greek mathematics [32].
The most forthright critic was Sabetai Unguru, who wrote a polemical paper [37]
in 1975 against it. He received replies of similar tone from three mathematicians
with historical interests: van der Waerden in 1976 [41], Hans Freudenthal in 1977
[8], and Andre´ Weil in 1978 [42]. The culprit replied in 1979 in another journal
[38], and, with David Rowe, he developed his position in more detail soon afterward
[39]. Other recent critics of geometric algebra include Wilbur Knorr in 1975 on the
evolution of the Elements, with a special emphasis on incommensurability [16];
Knorr again in 1986, where much Greek mathematics is viewed as concerned with
geometric problem-solving [18]; and Ian Mueller, who proposed in 1981 a different
kind of algebraic interpretation [21]. The year 1987 was a rich one for further
discussions in various contexts: by Fowler, who stressed analogies between Euclid’s
theory of ratios and continued fractions (without imposing the latter theory on the
Greeks) [5]; by R. H. Schmidt, on the issue of analytic and synthetic proof-methods
[31]; and by Roger Herz-Fischler, in a detailed study of the method of ‘‘division in
extreme and mean ratio’’ [14].
The quality of the dispute over geometric algebra has been somewhat dimmed
by the frequent failure on each side to make clear the epistemological place which
algebra is held to occupy (or not) in the Elements. A very useful distinction was
made in 1837 by William Rowan Hamilton in his paper [12] on irrational numbers.
He distinguished these three categories of algebraic mathematics:
‘‘Practical,’’ like an instrument; algebra just produces a convenient set of abbrevia-
tions by letters or simple signs for quantities and operations, and rules for the
subject at hand (for example, arithmetic);
‘‘Philological,’’ like a formula; algebra furnishes in some essential way the lan-
guage of the pertinent theory; and
‘‘Theoretical,’’ like a theorem; algebra provides the epistemological basis for
the theory.
Weak forms of the claim of geometric algebra (and arithmetic) invoke the practi-
cal category; that we can use algebra simply as a means of representing or abbreviat-
ing (some of) Euclid’s theorems and definitions. Strong claims, which have been
the center of concern, state that the Elements uses algebra theoretically (although
not philologically), that is, assert the advocates and deny the critics, the work is
at root algebraic in its conception, even though arithmetical and geometric in
its content.
The principal criticisms of the claim may be summarized as follows.
2.1. The algebra is simply the wrong style: there are no equations, or letters used
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in an algebraic way, in the Elements. In other words, the absence of the philological
category is quite crucial.
2.2. Had Euclid been thinking algebraically, he would have presented construc-
tions corresponding to easy manipulations of (1.1) (for example) which, in fact, are
absent from the Elements.
2.3. Information is lost when the algebra is introduced, in particular concerning
shapes of regions. Thus, using ‘‘p 1 q’’ to denote adding, say, two rectangles does
not distinguish between their being adjoined at the top, bottom, left, or right (Fig.
1 gives examples). Again, theorems about parallelograms are often (mis-)written
in terms of corresponding theorems about rectangles (*6.prop.28).
2.4. Common algebra is associated with analysis in the sense of reasoning from
a given result to principles already accepted. Euclidean geometry goes in the reverse,
synthetic, direction. Hence, proofs may well be warped.
2.5. Euclid never measures a geometrical magnitude of any kind. For example,
there is nothing in the Elements directly pertaining to f, in any of its four roles for
circles and spheres; apparently such mathematics was not Element-ary for him.
Hence the association with algebra leads to an emphasis on arithmetic which cannot
be justified.
2.6. If the Greeks really possessed this algebraic root, why did they not bring it
to light in the later phases of their civilization? Why, one might add, did that
philosophically sophisticated culture not introduce a word to denote, even if infor-
mally, this important notion? This point is strengthened by Klein’s real history of
algebra [15] from later Greek figures (especially Diophantos) through the Arabs
to the Renaissance and early modern Europeans, for a gradual process in three
stages is revealed: (1) using and maybe abbreviating words to denote operations
and known and unknown quantities, (2) replacing these words by symbols or single
letters, and (3) allowing letters also to denote variables as well as unknowns and
extending notational systems for powers. The interpretation of Euclid as a geometri-
cal algebraist requires him to have passed all three stages; and while he might have
skated through them with greater ease than did his successors, the total silence
over his achievement among his compatriots is indeed surprising.
3. THREE FEATURES OF THE ELEMENTS
To me these criticisms appear quite correct; to borrow a word and notation from
Lagrange’s algebraic version of the calculus, the geometric algebraist constructed
from the Elements is not Euclid but Euclid9, a fictional figure derived from Euclid’s
text by means which he helped to inspire in successors but did not possess himself.
I return in section 11 to the general methodological point involved here.
The following three features of the geometry in the Elements seem to provide
clear evidence of central differences between Euclid and Euclid9.
3.1. In his geometry, Euclid never multiplies a magnitude by a magnitude; for
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example, the line of length b is never multiplied by itself to produce the square b2.
This is particularly clear in (1.prop.46), where he constructs a square (already
defined in (1.def.22)): not even there, and nor anywhere else in the Elements, is it
stated, assumed, or proved that the area of the square is the square of a side.
Thus, for example, Pythagoras’s theorem, which follows at once with its converse
(1.props.47–48), states that two squares are equal to a third one, and the well-
known proof works by shuffling around regions of various shapes according to
principles of congruence and composition; nowhere are area formulae involved. To
make an analogy (and no more) with arithmetic, this theorem deals with, say, 9 1
16 5 25, but not with 32 1 42 5 52. The same point applies to his extension
(6.prop.31) of the theorem, concerning similar rectangles laid out on each side of
the triangle.
In other words, in Euclid’s geometry the square on the side is not the square of
the side, or the side squared; it is a planar region which has this size. In the same
way, he never construes the side of a square as the square root of the square; a
square can have an associated side (*10.prop.54). Heath always translates Euclid’s
description of such figures by phrases such as ‘‘square on’’ [t«tra´cgnon a© fo´] AB
(*1.prop.47), or the rectangle ‘‘contained’’ [f«ri«xo´e«non] by its sides AB, CB
(*2.prop.4 above); but unfortunately, in his own commentaries, he writes algebraic
equivalents of AB2 and AB 3 CB. The standard German translation [35] of the
Elements by Clemens Thaer between 1933 and 1937, is even more disappointing
in this respect; for there terms such as ‘‘AB2’’ are used in Euclid’s text. Of course,
the Greeks knew the area property as well as anyone (especially in the taxation
office); so its avoidance by Euclid is deliberate. Indeed, he avoided multiplying all
kinds of geometric magnitude, for reasons explained in Section 5.
To take another important example, the method of ‘‘application of areas’’ to a
line means that a rectangle (or maybe parallelogram) is constructed with that line
as a side and equal to some given region, perhaps under further conditions also
((*6.prop.28) in Section 1). But no theorems about areas as areas—that is, quantities
with arithmetically expressible properties—are involved.
This eschewal of geometrical products seems to refute the reading as geometric
algebra on its own, in all three of Hamilton’s categories. For example, (1.1) is an
algebraic travesty of Euclid’s geometry, since none of its four magnitudes involved
appears in his theory.
By contrast, in Euclid’s arithmetic numbers can be multiplied: for example, he
even calculates triples of numbers, involving squares, which satisfy Pythagoras’s
theorem (10.prop.28, Lemmas 1–2). Thus, the algebraic version of his arithmetic
is free of this objection (though not of others, as we see in Section 10).
3.2. While he speaks of the equality of numbers and of magnitudes, Euclid never
says that ratios are ‘‘equal’’ to each other, only that they are ‘‘in the same ratio
[«©n tgˆ
i
ay©tgˆ
i
lo´cgˆ
i
],’’ or that one ratio ‘‘is as’’ the other in a proportion proposition.
Thus, the use of ‘‘5’’ for ratios, normal in geometric algebra, is again a travesty
(see Section 7).
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3.3. Euclid’s method of compounding ratios is not at all the same as multiplication,
although the two theories exhibit structural similarity (Section 7). Similarly, his
theory of a lesser integer l being ‘‘parts’’ of a greater one g is not one of rational
numbers l/g smaller than unity.
Following the critics of geometric algebra, I claim that Euclid studies numbers,
geometrical magnitudes, and ratios in the Elements. I shall use ‘‘quantity’’ as a
neutral umbrella term to cover these three ‘‘types,’’ and when clear I shall just
say ‘‘magnitudes’’ for the second one. They are different from each other as
objects, and they have a different ensemble of means of combination and of
comparison, although some structural similarity between them is evident. In the
next six sections, I shall amplify this claim, treating the quantities in the above
order. Like most other commentators on Euclid, I find mysterious the order in
which the Books lie: numbers are formally treated in Books 7–9, but they
appear in many of the other ten, which are basically concerned with magnitudes;
ratios first appear in Book 5 and regularly thereafter, usually within proportions
(which are described in section 7).
4. EUCLID’S NUMBERS
Euclid presents a theory of positive integers [a© riueo´§] starting with 2; 1 is a unit,
and there is no zero (7.defs.1–2). The basic combinations and comparisons are
given in Book 7.
Numbers can be combined under the operations of addition, subtraction ‘‘of
the lesser from the greater’’ to ensure that the resultant number is positive,
and multiplication (7.defs.5, 7, and 15 and props.18 and 3–4). Numbers may be
‘‘equal to’’ [©i´so§], ‘‘greater’’ [e«i´zgn], or ‘‘less’’ [«©la´ssgn] than each other; the
basic properties of equality are covered by three basic ‘‘common notions’’ in
Book 1.
Euclid does not divide integers to produce rational numbers (contrary, once
again, to the geometric algebraists’ reading discussed in Section 2.5). Instead, a
lesser number l is ‘‘part’’ [e«´ro§] or ‘‘parts’’ [e«´rh] of a greater one g according
as l ‘‘measures’’ g or not (7.defs.3–5)—to us, whether l is a factor of g or not.
For example (my own), 3 is part of 9, 3 is parts of 7, and 6 is the ‘‘same parts’’
(*7.prop.6) of 14; but the rational numbers Dl, Dj, and aYf are not constructed
thereby. Similarly, Euclid’s rule for finding the least common multiple of numbers,
ratios of them, and properties of part (7.props.36–39) cannot be so read.
The only exception is the use of part numbers, mostly ‘‘a half’’ (*13.prop.13),
and occasionally cases such as ‘‘a third part’’ (12.prop.10) on the volume of a
cylinder) and a ‘‘fifth’’ (lemma to (13.prop.18), on measuring angles). They
correspond to 1 as part of 2 (or 3, or 5, or . . .) rather than to unit fractions.
Presumably their Egyptian parentage gave them a special status [17]; an ex-
planation from Euclid would have been helpful! In addition, he uses numbers
in connection with geometrical magnitudes in a way described in the next
section.
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In (7.defs.16–19) and thereafter in the Books on arithmetic, Euclid presents
numbers on occasion as lines, their squares as geometrical squares, and cubes as
solids; and he says that a square number has a ‘‘side’’ [fl«yra´] (8.prop.11). This
overloads the link, however, for he is treating arithmetic within geometry, which
is the realm of his theory of magnitudes—and a quite different theory, as we shall
now see.
5. EUCLID’S GEOMETRICAL MAGNITUDES: GLOSSARY
Euclid’s theory of numbers deals with discrete quantities; the continuous ones
are handled in geometry. Here he works with ten kinds (another general term of
mine) of magnitude [e«´c«uo§] in five pairs, again with no zero;2 many of them are
defined, or so he thought, in (1.defs.1–23). The pairs divide on the property of
being straight or curved for each magnitude. In fact, the latter are confined to
circles and spheres, although the ideas seem applicable somewhat more broadly,
at least to simple concave or convex curves and surfaces.
The pairs of magnitudes are listed below, with an example of each given in
brackets. As usual, I distinguish a magnitude from any possibly arithmetical value
that it may take: a line has length, a region or surface has area, a solid has volume,
and an angle has measure.
Kind Straight Curved
lines straight (line) planar curved (arc of circle)
regions planar rectilinear (rectangle) planar curvilinear (segment of a circle)
surfaces spatial rectilinear (pyramid) spatial curvilinear (sphere)
solids rectilinear (cube) curvilinear (hemisphere)
angles planar solid planar3
In these examples I distinguish between, say, a circle as a closed curved line and
as a convex region, or a cube as a closed surface and as a convex solid; Euclid does
the same, without confusion. He does not consider curves in space or surfaces or
solids set upon some kind of rectilinear base; probably he had no examples in mind
of the latter.
The distinction between straight and curved magnitudes is a natural one; for
example, it plays a key role in the theory of limits. Its place in Euclid (and in the
work of many other Greek mathematicians) is evident in Book 10, where proofs
of theorems relating rectilinear and curvilinear solids work by double contradiction
(A 5 B because both A , B and A . B lead to absurdities) rather than a direct
process of limit-taking, which would cross this conceptual boundary.
2 In Book 3, Euclid deals with tangents to circles and touching circles; while he skirmishes with
curvilinear angles (*3.prop.16), he does not seem to use a zero as such.
3 ‘‘Solid angles’’ (Euclid’s name) appear only in (11.def.11 and props.20–26), and in the proof that
there are only five regular solids (addendum to (13.prop.18)); but they are handled in the same way as
other magnitudes. Similarly, the theory of solids is far less developed than that of lines and regions—to
Plato’s distraction in Republic 528a–d [5, 117–121].
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In addition, Euclid has on occasion ‘‘multitude’’ [flhˆuo§] of a quantity, an
informal idea referring to an unspecified number of them (*7.prop.14) for
numbers, ((*10.def.3) for magnitudes). He also speaks of ‘‘equal in multitude,’’
which we would treat as a 1–1 correspondence between members of two such
collections (*5.prop.1) for magnitudes).
This leaves the status of points. The famous (1.def.1), defining a point ‘‘as
that which has no part,’’ is well recognised as a failed definition. I take it to
be a principle of atomicity, asserting the existence of a point as a ‘‘primitive’’
part of a magnitude, such as something inside a sphere, for example, or the
place where two lines intersect or where a line has an extremity. It is striking
to note that Euclid actually wrote of a ‘‘sign’’ [she«iˆon], and, in particular
cases, said ‘‘this A,’’ not ‘‘the point A.’’ Perhaps inspired by Plato, the change
from ‘‘point’’ [sticeh´] was maintained by most of Euclid’s contemporaries and
successors, although Aristotle used both words [23, 376–379]. But the old tradition
was to prevail again from the 5th century, when in the spirit of Roman empiricism
translators and commentators Martianus Capella and Boethius rendered
‘‘she«iˆon’’ as ‘‘punctum’’ (see Heath in [13, 1:155–156]). However, the reformers
had a good case; ‘‘sign’’ makes clear that the objects denoted do not admit the
means of combination or comparison to which magnitudes are subject, and which
we now examine.
6. EUCLID’S GEOMETRICAL MAGNITUDES:
HANDLING WITHIN EACH KIND
The key feature of Euclid’s treatment of magnitudes is that, with an important
exception to be noted in Section 9, the means of combinations and comparisons
are treated between magnitudes of the same kind—in my view, consciously and
intentionally. Since his magnitudes vary considerably in character (from a line
to a solid), he does not always use the same word for the same sort of
combination, and in some cases no word at all; but they may be fairly characterised
as follows.
Magnitudes of the same kind may be added or subtracted, the latter combination
restricted to positive resultant magnitudes.4 They may also be multiplied by num-
bers; when the number is an integer, a ‘‘multiple’’ of the magnitude is produced,
but there may also arise, for example, the one-and-a-half of a square in (13.prop.13)
of Section 4. The converse never happens; that is, numbers are never multiplied
by magnitudes. This difference shows on its own than they are different types
of quantity.
Their comparisons are ‘‘equal to,’’ ‘‘greater than,’’ or ‘‘less than’’ (1.common
notions.4–5, post.5). Euclid uses the same words as for numbers, but only structurally
4 Euclid would not have regarded every possible combination as meaningful: for example, an arc to
a circle (considered as a curvilinear line), or at the end of an infinitely long line (as permitted to exist
(1.def.23) by the parallel postulate (1.post.5)).
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similar notions are involved, not identical ones (see Section 10 below). He does
not equate a rectilinear region with a curvilinear one; indeed, in connection with
the famous problem of squaring the circle, his commentator, Proclus (5th century
A.D.), explicitly mentioned this possibility as a worthwhile research topic [28, 334–
335]. Euclid may well have deemed this problem, and similar ones such as squaring
lunes, as not Element-ary—and with good justice!
Once it is recognized that Euclid handles magnitudes of the same kind, the
reasons for his avoidance of their multiplication become clear. First, the kind would
be changed; for example, the product of a straight line and a straight line is a
rectilinear region. Second, many of the multiplications cannot be defined anyway
(angle with angle, line with angle, solid with line, and so on); so for uniformity he
omits all of them.
This point must not be confused with the fact that many theorems involve magni-
tudes of different kinds at the same time; for example, there are many in Book 10
in which lines and rectilinear regions appear together. However, no means of
combination or comparison between kinds occurs.
7. EUCLID’S RATIOS AND PROPORTIONS
The ratio [lo´co§] is Euclid’s third type of quantity. It is specified only between
two numbers or between two magnitudes of the same kind. Following the 17th-
century English astronomer, Vincent Wing, I shall write ‘‘a : b’’ for the ratio of two
such quantities a and b.
Euclid’s presentation is not clear. The ratio of numbers is not formally defined
at all, but it creeps in first in (7.def.20) in a proportion about the sameness of
two pairs of ratios, and is used in a theorem about subtraction (7.prop.11).
Further, he does not stress that the ratio, say, 3 : 7, is different in type from 3
being parts of 7, which is a property within arithmetic (recall Section 4 above).
Something like a definition of the ratio of magnitudes appears in (5.def.3): ‘‘A
ratio is a sort of relation in respect of size between two magnitudes of the same
kind.’’ The word ‘‘size’’ [fhliko´th§] denotes the measure of the ratio. This definition
is best interpreted as creative, although, of course, he had no theory of the sort
that has been developed in this century—that is, a definition is creative relative to
a theory if there exist theorems in the theory which cannot be proved without using
the definition.
Comparisons between a pair of ratios are expressed in the companion theory,
that of proportions [a© naloci´a] between a pair of ratios. In addition to bringing
some clarity to the role of these mysterious ratios, the main advance of proportion
theory over magnitude theory is that ratios of magnitudes of two different kinds
can be compared (for example, between lines and regions in (6.prop.1)), and/
or compared with ratios of numbers, by comparison of their sizes. For magnitudes
a ratio may be ‘‘in the same ratio as,’’ ‘‘greater than’’ (5.defs.5–7), or ‘‘less
than’’ (not formally defined) the other one. The comparison in question is
established in Eudoxus’s manner by examining (in)equalities between multiples
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of the magnitudes involved.5 The two theories of sameness are quite different,
showing again that numbers and magnitudes are distinct types of quantity.
Euclid’s total avoidance of the word ‘‘equals’’ [©i´so§] for ratios shows in the
clearest manner possible that he saw them as a third type of quantity distinct from
numbers and magnitudes (or perhaps as a relation between its components). Hence,
I follow the practice initiated by Wing’s wise contemporary, William Oughtred, in
the 17th century in symbolizing sameness by ‘‘::’’. Writing a, b, c, d for magnitudes,
we never find equations such as, say,
a : 2b 5 c : d, but the proportion a : 2b :: c : d. (7.1)
The habit of the geometric algebraist of writing ‘‘5’’ between ratios is inadmissible,
as also is the habit of drawing consequences involving the multiplication of magni-
tudes, such as
a 3 d 5 2b 3 c. (7.2)
One of the most extensive uses of magnitudes and ratios in the Elements is
the theory of (in)commensurable and (ir)rational6 magnitudes (mostly straight
lines and rectilinear regions) in the virtuoso Book 10. These properties are
based upon ‘‘anthyphairesis,’’ the successive subtraction of lesser from greater
magnitudes of the same kind so as (not) to produce a ratio the same as that
of two integers, respectively (10.props.2 and 5–6). Note that it is not a theory
of irrational numbers. Indeed, he proves that two magnitudes are incommensurable
if and only if the ratio ‘‘have not to one another the ratio which a number has
to a number’’ (10.props.7–8). Therefore, an error in type of quantity is committed
when it is compared with Dedekind’s theory of irrationals, unless one invokes
from Dedekind’s side the so-called ‘‘Cantor–Dedekind axiom’’ to set each
irrational number in isomorphism with a geometric length. Indeed, Euclid may
have taken up some existing theory of such numbers and translated it into
5 Euclid never presents proportions between trios or greater multitudes of numbers or of magnitudes
of the same kind. Presumably, the reasons were that the case of nonsameness cannot be defined (sameness
presents no difficulties), and that anthyphairesis becomes very hard to execute. Similarly, his theorems
in Book 8 on numbers in ‘‘continued proportion’’ (geometric progressions to us, and also to Weil in
his rather marginal objection [42] to Unguru) work by taking only neighboring pairs of numbers together.
A geometric version of such sequences would be easy to produce, as pairs of bases of these triangles,
which have successive right angles at A, . . . , G, . . . :
6 With little enthusiasm, I follow the tradition of translating ‘‘(a© )lo´co§’’ as ‘‘(ir)rational’’; something
like ‘‘(in)expressible’’ is much better (as Heath himself noted in [13, 3:525]). Euclid defines irrationality
from incommensurability by assigning a line as a basis relative to which such ratios can be defined his
way (the rather messy (10.defs.3–4), which cover also (in)commensurability in square).
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geometrical terms, since only in geometry can the continuum of magnitudes
upon which it depended be guaranteed.
However, numbers do have a role in anthyphairesis, as counters of repetitions.
For example, the magnitude 7 subtracts from 46 six times, with remainder 4; 4 from
7 once with remainder 3; and so on, generating the sequence 6, 1, . . . .7 These ellipsis
dots can encompass an unending sequence of remainders, sometimes periodic, with
remarkable properties [6]. They are still not well studied, although the (arithmetical)
theory of continued fractions bears some structural similarity to them [5, Chaps. 5
and 9].
8. EUCLID’S RATIOS: A MUSICAL BACKGROUND?
Why did Euclid always avoid speaking of equal ratios? It is plausible that, like
his contemporaries and predecessors, he understood ratio theory as generalized
music, at least culturally [2] and perhaps even philosophically. Whatever the Pytha-
goreans did or did not do (and doubtless more sources of information were available
then than now), properties of strings and comparisons between tones and lengths
were a major part of the mathematics of their time and had remained so until
Euclid’s.8 In such contexts, the notion of equality is not as natural as with numbers
or magnitudes. We usually say that the intervals F#–A and B–D are the same
interval (here a minor third) rather than that they are equal—for the first is placed
a major fifth above the second one. Further, the trio of Euclidean quantities,
number–magnitude–ratio, surely bears an intentional cultural correlation with three
subjects of the Aristotelian quadrivium, arithmetica–geometria–harmonia.
This association with music is evident also in the method of combination to
which ratios are subject: they are to be ‘‘compounded’’ [syck«i´e«non], tardily in
(6.prop.23). In the simplest case, the ratio a : b may be put together with b : c to
produce the ratio a : c (5.def.9), the ‘‘duplicate ratio’’ of the original pair. This
procedure is clearly similar in structure to taking the musical intervals (say) D#–F#
and F#–C to produce D#–C. Further, as with music, the process may be repeated,
to produce the ‘‘triplicate ratio’’ a : d after three stages (5.def.10), and the ‘‘ex
equali’’ proportion which arises from the ratio a : n achieved after N stages (5.def.17).
Clearly, one cannot follow (some) geometric algebraists and identify this proce-
dure with multiplication, although there is obvious structural similarity between
the two means of combination (in the practical category but not the theoretical,
Hamilton might say). But note that even if the quantities are all numbers, a com-
pounded ratio results, not an arithmetical product. For example, with the symbol
‘‘?’’ denoting compounding, note the difference between the propositions
7 Maybe anthyphairesis inspired Euclid’s use of the curious term ‘‘parts’’ for integers not in factorial
form (recall Section 5): 7 is parts of 46 because 46 : 7 leads to repetition numbers 4, 1, . . . , whereas 7
is part of 42 because 42 : 7 yields 6 ‘‘straight off.’’ The term may also have come from talk of the time
on unit fractions and calculations.
8 In an undeservedly neglected essay [19], Ernest McClain argues that ratios were a fundamental
theory in many cultures, and he suggests novel interpretations for several aspects of Plato. Before Euclid,
other applications had been made of ratios, for example, to astronomical motions and calendars.
368 IVOR GRATTAN-GUINNESS HM 23
(3 : 7) · (7 : 11) :: 3 : 11 and (3/7)(7/11) 5 3/11; (8.1)
not only do they differ by type of quantity, but the latter proposition cannot even
be stated in the Elements (recall Section 4).
Further, unlike a general definition of multiplication, Euclid does not offer the
general definition of compounding any two ratios of magnitudes, for it would read
(a : b) · (c : d) :5? ([a 3 c] : [b 3 d ]), (8.2)
which involves the forbidden product of magnitudes. The product could be replaced
by regions in certain cases such as the rectangles contained by a and c and by b
and d if all four magnitudes were lines—but not in full generality, for the reasons
explained in Section 6. Nevertheless, it appears in (6.prop.23), the interesting but
isolated proposition which substitutes for the multiplication (1.1) of sides: it states
that the ratio of two equiangular parallelograms is the compound of the ratios of
the respective pairs of sides.9 In the proof (see Fig. 2), the given parallelograms
ADCB and CGFE are aligned to admit the intermediate parallelogram DHGC in
the (gnomon-like) figure, so that
h ADCB : h CGFE :: (h ADCB : h DHGC) · (h DHGC : h CGFE) (8.3)
:: (BC : CG) · (CD : CE). (8.4)
FIGURE 2
9 This is the proposition in which Euclid first uses the word ‘‘compounded’’; (6.def.5) is an interpolation,
not always included in editions. While the theory as such seems clear, his presentation is not good,
either at (6.prop.23) or elsewhere. Compounding occurs in (6.props.19–20) on taking ratios of areas of
triangles and polygons; in (8.prop.5) on plane numbers and (8.props.11–12) on determining mean
proportions between numbers; in (12.props.12–18 passim) on various propositions mentioned in Section
9 concerning the volumes of cones, cylinders, and spheres; and in (13.prop.11) in making a square 25
times bigger than another one. Contrary to Heath’s editorial remarks, I do not see compounding
necessarily present in (5.props.20–23), where various theorems on ratios of the same value are proved.
Saito provides a good discussion of compounding (unfortunately notated ‘‘1’’) in Euclid and also in
Apollonius; however, he considers possible theorems involving (8.2) [30, 32, 38, 59], and uses ‘‘5’’ in
proportions. Compounding ratios is not to be confused with their composition (5.def.14): given a : b,
form (a 1 b) : b.
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9. MIXED KINDS: THE ALTERNATION THEOREM
One feature in Euclid’s theory of ratios needs to be resolved: the alternation
theorem (5.prop.16), according to which, in the notation of (7.1) for magnitudes,
if a : b :: c : d, then a : c :: b : d. (9.1)
There is a surprise: Euclid asks only that the pairs a and b, and c and d, be each
of the same kind, not that the whole quartet be so. Thus, as it stands, the theorem
asserts in its second proposition the sameness of two ‘‘mixed ratios’’ (my name),
where a pair of ratios of the same different magnitudes are related. This feature
has often been regarded as a slip (by Heath, for example, in his commentary on
the theorem [13, 2:165]). In the influential earlier edition by Robert Simson, the
seemingly missing clause was even interpolated into the text.
But in my view Euclid has not made a mistake here (although, regrettably, he
supplies no explanation either), for in one context he uses mixed ratios. This is in
Book 12, where he presents his version of Eudoxus’s theory of exhaustion of
curvilinear by rectilinear regions. The first occasion arises when he proves that
‘‘circles are to one another as the squares on the diameters’’ (12.prop.2). There,
he constructs regular polygons inside each circle and then uses (9.1) to show the
sameness of the ratios of each polygon to its parent circle.10 The same procedure
occurs in the companion theorem about spheres (12.prop.18) and in two theorems
about cones and cylinders on circular bases (12.props.11–12). The proofs work by
double contradiction, the type mentioned in Section 5.
Euclid’s extension of proportion theory to mixed ratios is minimal, in that the
magnitudes involved are at least of the same dimension each time. But it goes
beyond the practice elsewhere in the Elements—and as an extension it escaped
Heath’s attention.
10. EUCLID’S ONTOLOGY
Euclid treats his quantities in a very direct way: he has numbers, angles, lines,
regions, ratios, and so on. No constructed object depends upon the means of con-
struction in a reductionist sense, such as a square as the product of its sides. This
directness is also evident in his Data, where he presents a string of geometric
exercises; for each one is expressed in the form that ‘‘if so-and-so properties of
[say] a triangle are given, then such-and-such properties are given.’’ The phrase
‘‘are (is) given’’ [d«doe«´non] is the Leitmotiv of the entire work.11
10 There may be a slip in the diagram attached to this theorem. Two ‘‘areas’’ S and T play roles in
the proof, and mainly in the comparison of equality to circles. Therefore, even granted that both
rectilinear and curvilinear regions are involved in the proof, surely the latter shapes are more appropriate
than the rectangles that have been drawn. This feature seems to be of long standing; for example, it is
evident in the recent medieval Latin version of the Elements edited by Busard and Folkerts [3, 1:294].
Little seems to be known about the history of the diagrams in the Elements.
11 Taisbak argues that ‘‘are given’’ refers to static states of affairs rather than dynamic ones of potential
movement [33]. This may also be a motive, though I prefer to give priority to a simpler explanation—that
Euclid means just what he says. Maybe ‘‘be the case that’’ would be a better translation. See also
Schmidt [31] on this matter.
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In his work, Euclid uses three different types of quantity, often together but with
their theories distinguished. Much similarity of structure obtains between them;
but there are also essential differences, so that identity of content cannot be asserted.
This point is an important one in the philosophy of real mathematics when analogy
plays a prominent role [10]. Unfortunately, the geometric algebraists miss it, for
they assert that the same algebra obtains for each type of quantity. As Nesselmann
put it in 1847 [24, 154]: ‘‘Allow us, however, to consider and to treat as arithmetical
under our kind of thinking this theory which Euclid proposed geometrically. . . .
thus it would be hard to lay down a strong boundary between form and content
as a ground for division’’ [24, 154]. While a perfectly legitimate reading of Euclid9,
it is a distortion of Euclid, and can lead to confusions—for instance, in identifying
his theory of irrational magnitudes with modern ones of irrational numbers, or
regarding numbers as special kinds of magnitude (see, for example, Heath in [13,
2:124, 113], respectively).
Each type of quantity in Euclid has to be considered separately for its possible
algebra. Converse to the phrase ‘‘geometric algebra,’’ I shall use ‘‘algebraic’’ as an
adjective in each case, to show that it qualifies the succeeding quantity noun.
First, there might be a case for algebraic arithmetic, though at most only for the
practical category and only for integers and unit fractions. However, the fact that
(unfortunately) Euclid gave numbers a geometric interpretation reduces the quality
of the case even there—which seems to be the only place in the Elements where
the phrase ‘‘geometric arithmetic’’ could be justified. Among his successors, a
philological category for algebraic arithmetic begins to emerge only with Diophantos
in the 3rd century A.D., and then not fully.
Second, any theory of algebraic magnitudes must be radically different from
geometric algebra. The avoidance of multiplication of magnitudes rules it out on
its own, and the other criticisms rehearsed in Section 2 are very powerful. Mueller
has given a cogent account of several of them [21]; however, his alternative, a sort
of logico-functorial algebra, seems also to take us far from Euclid’s numbers and
magnitudes, although in a different direction from that of the geometric algebra-
ists—to Euclid0, say.12 Abstract algebra, such as groups and fields, would set us off
down yet another irrelevant track.
Finally, a case for algebraic ratios might be argued, as long as compounding is
not identified with arithmetical multiplication. However, the background in music
provides a far more faithful orientation.
If one wishes to pursue algebraisation at all, symbols corresponding to the shapes
might be introduced, such as ‘‘h a’’ for the square on side a and ‘‘O a’’ for a circle
with that diameter; Heath used such notations occasionally (*12.prop.7). However,
even modern computers do not always readily supply the required symbols. Another
12 Mueller [21] has, for example, SIMSOLID (k, l) for solid (that is, cubed) numbers k and l, followed
by a definition in terms of mathematical logic. But a significant anachronism is evident here; for his use
of quantification deploys set-theoretic interpretations of the quantities involved, whereas Euclid’s own
treatment of collections follows the very different part–whole tradition of handling collections.
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good strategy is that of Dijksterhuis [4], who used functorial letters such as ‘‘T(a)’’
for the square on side a, and ‘‘O(a,b)’’ for the rectangle with sides a and b.
Should algebra-like symbols be desired, different symbols must be used for the
‘‘same’’ means of combination and comparison when applied to different quantities.
A possible choice could be these:
Multiplication/ Equality/ Greater Less
Quantity Addition Subtraction Division13 compounding sameness than than
Numbers 1 2 : 3 5 . ,
Magnitudes ‡ p : P @ !
Ratios ? :: :: ::
Operations on magnitudes apply within each kind, of course, with the extension to
cover exhaustion theory as described in Section 9. The same symbol ‘‘:’’ is proposed
for the ratios of numbers and of magnitudes precisely because a ratio is created
on each occasion. In the case of magnitudes and ratios, the means of combination
are to be understood in a rather abstract, operational sense. While still far away
from Euclid, a closer sense to him than geometric algebra is furnished by the
connotation of the interior and exterior products which Hermann Grassmann pro-
posed in his Ausdehnungslehre of 1844. It is a great irony that his work was gaining
publicity in the 1880s and 1890s, exactly when Heiberg and Tannery were trying to
convert Euclid into Descartes!
11. THE TENACITY OF ALGEBRAIC THINKING
As the case of Euclid ? Euclid9 exemplifies, algebra is not among the ancient
roots of mathematics, and to impose it on Euclid distorts and even falsifies his
intentions. Moreover, the point is not restricted to the Greeks, for claims of similarity
between their mathematics and that of the Babylonians and the Chinese have been
grounded in the alleged common factor of geometric algebra. The principle seems
to be a (mistaken) application to history of Euclid’s own (1.ax.1), that ‘‘things which
are equal to the same thing are equal to each other’’!
Although not an ancient source for mathematics, algebra and algebraic thinking
and styles have long assumed a central role in much mathematics and mathematical
education. (Recall how often children identify mathematics with equations and
formulae, often in disgust.) The case, and even the name of ‘‘geometric algebra,’’
shows the tenacity of the algebraic style [11]; for it characterizes an algebra which
is geometric, not even a geometry (or arithmetic) which might be algebraic. Note,
by contrast, that nobody in the late 19th century suggested that Aristotle’s syllogistic
logic was a logical algebra, although it influenced substantially (though partly by
reaction) the development of algebraic logic at that time [9].
The underlying philosophy behind the interpretation of the Elements as geometric
algebra, common to mathematicians’ and sometimes even historians’ understanding
13 I use the word ‘‘division’’ in its modern sense, not in a way alluding to anthyphairesis.
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FIGURE 3
of the history of mathematics in general, is historical confirmation theory: Suppose
that a theory T1 , created during epoch E1 , is followed by a later theory T2 in epoch
E2 ; then at epoch E3 the (non-)historical reading is proposed that T1 was conceived
by its creators as an intended draft of T2 , and thereby confirms it. Roll on history,
deterministically [27].
While this reading might be correct or at least arguable in some cases, it should
be treated with caution, for it may well propose as actual developments what were
only potential. For example, Euclid’s Elements undoubtedly influenced the real
development of algebra among the Arabs and then (in a rather different form)
during the Western Renaissance; but it does not at all follow that Euclid himself
had been trying to be a geometric algebraist [38]. The history of the various readings
that Euclid has received over the centuries regarding his types of quantity and their
handling before the era of geometric algebra would be a valuable contribution to
historiography. He may have been better understood by (some!) later Greeks and
in the Middle Ages than later, when algebraicization began to develop in the stages
outlined in Section 2. The final quartet of specific examples illustrates the point.
First, Heath’s edition provides a frequent oscillation between Euclid in English
and Euclid9 in algebra, sometimes to such an extent that he actually attributes a
different procedure to Euclid. The example (6.prop.28) of Section 1 on constructing
a certain parallelogram is a very good case. ‘‘To exhibit the exact correspondence
between geometrical and the ordinary algebraical method of solving the equation,’’
Heath sets up a Euclid9-style quadratic equation (in which Euclid’s parallelograms
are—consciously—replaced by rectangles . . .), and after some working he calculates
an expression for a certain line GO in the original proof. However, two pages
earlier Euclid mentions GO only once [13, 2:262–265].
Second, in his reply to Unguru, van der Waerden clearly explains that he uses
the word ‘‘algebra’’ ‘‘for expressions like (a 1 b)2, and how to solve linear and
quadratic equations’’ [40, 200]. He then takes (2.prop.1), in Heath’s translation (see
Fig. 3): ‘‘If there be two straight lines, and one of them be cut into any number of
segments, the rectangle contained by the two straight lines is equal to the rectangles
contained by the uncut straight line and each of the segments.’’ Geometrically, this
theorem just means that every rectangle can be cut into rectangles by lines parallel
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to one of the sides. This is evident: everyone sees it by just looking at the diagram.
Within the framework of geometry there is no need for such a theorem: Euclid
never makes use of it in his first four books.
But Euclid’s text and van der Waerden’s version say different things: Euclid
builds up the full rectangle R from its components to form rectangles and state a
property of them [30, 54–60]; van der Waerden breaks it up into those components
from R. Of course, the theorem is very simple; hence its location at the head of
Book 2. But the construction embodied here (recall from Section 2.4 that Euclid
often conflated them with the theorems themselves) underlies or at least relates to
many theorems from Book 2 onwards, starting with (2.prop.2), long before Book
5 is reached.
Third, Freudenthal’s reply [8] to Unguru defending geometric algebra is uninten-
tionally amusing; for he explicitly praises Dijksterhuis’s edition as a source to read
Euclid, and then makes all the mistakes that Dijksterhuis avoids—multiplication
of magnitudes, equality between ratios, compounding as multiplication, and so on!
The final pair of examples are small but interesting ones, since they come respec-
tively from a critic and an agnostic of geometric algebra. Both involve the unfortu-
nate practise of setting ‘‘5’’ between ratios in a proportion. Szabo´ makes it in the
very book which later on contains his attack on geometric algebra mentioned in
Section 2 [32, 131]. So does Benno Artmann, in a nice recent short survey of the
Elements, in which he regards the issue of geometric algebra as ‘‘moot’’ [1, 7, 45–47].
Many other examples of this and other dubious procedures can be found, even
in several other items in the bibliography here. Algebraic thinking holds on tight;
as Peyrard declared already in 1814, ‘‘Mr. Lagrange . . . often repeated to me that
Geometry was a dead language’’ [26, ix].
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